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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
DOHRMAN HOTEL SUPPLY CO.,
a Corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
BEAU BRUM:3IEL, INc.
a Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
.-\ ppP.a} From tne Third District Court of Utah1
for Salt Lake County
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATE~IENT

OF THE CAS:lli

In the month of October, 1934, Mr. George
Glaus and Rlosa Glaus, his wife, as, officers and
principal owners of the defendant corporation, and
th~ corporation were preparing to open a new cafe
in Salt Lake City, under the name of Beau Brummel
Cafe, and were in the market for a complete set-up
Qf restaurant equipment. During 10ctober, 1934,
Mr George Glaus. the president and manager of
the defendant, Beau Brummel, Ine., went to Los
A ng-C'les, California, for the purpose of buying
rE':-;taurant equipment for the defendant company.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lie had been in the restaurant business for some
25 or 30 years. He went to plaintiff's place of
husiness and picked out a considerable amount of
1nerchandise handled by the plaintiff company a~
the Los Angeles store. Mr. Glaus then made a
special trip from Los Angeles up to San Francisco
to see a piece of equipment known and designated
as a thern1otainer, which the plaintiff company had
in its San Francisco store. After Mr. Glaus saw
:and examined the thermotainer, he decided to purchase the same for defendant, and went hack to
Los Angeles and entered into a conditional sales
contract on behalf of the defendant company for
the purchase from the plaintiff of all of said mer··
t•handise, including the thermotainer, which he had
inspected and selected at San Francisco. The contract. a~ entered into at the home office of the plaintiff company, at Los Angeles, specifically stated
that, although the price was set out at $2898.41, it
might fluctuate either above or below that amount,
depending upon the items actually delivered. The
defendant agreed to pay for the items. actually delivered, and the plaintiff, under the terms of said
'-~ontract, retained title to all of said merchandise
as actually delivered, until paid in full.
At the trial it was stipulated that the total
purchase price of the merchandise actually delivered under the contract was $2492.17. Upon thi::;
amount, the defendant made payments and received
credits totalling 'in the aggregate $1,966.33, leaving
a halance due at the time suit was filed herein of
approximately $525.84, plus some interest, as the
contract called for interest at the rate of eight percent per annum from_ the due dates of the mrious
installmer1ts. This balance not having been paid
by the defendant, the plaintiff, in .June of 193m filed
an action in replevin in the City Court of Salt J.;ake
City, asking for the possession of said merchanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dise, and in the event the possession could not be
had, a judgment for the value thereof. In the
,original con1plaint, as filed in the City Court, the
value \\~a~ stated as $555.08. At the time of the
trial in the City Court, an mnendment was made to
conform to the proof adduced in the City Court,
by which amendment, the value of the property was
stated to be approxin1ately $900.00. At the trial in
the City Court, the defendant by its answer raised,
in addition to general denials, merely a question as
to whether there had been a settlement entered into
tetween plaintiff and defendant. After judgment
for plaintiff, the defendant appealed to the District
Court, and then filed an amended answer wherein
it set up, in addition to the deffense of settlement,
a defense of breach of warranty. The defendant
claims that at the time the thermotainer was sold
to it, there \\~as not only an express warranty given
by the plaintiff company, but also that implied
warranties would be raised by virtue of the cireumstances surrounding the transaction. Defendant then claims that there has been a breach of this
implied warranty, and seeks a deduction from the
purcha:::e price by way of recoupment !or the
claimed b:reach of warranty.
\Vhen :Jfr. Glaus inspected the thermotainer at San
Francisco, he was. there told that it originally cost
$1500.00, and that it had been sold and had been
out in the possession of some concern that ha6
gone broke and the plaintiff company, because of
thP insolvency of the original buyer, had been compelled to take it back, and that although the original
cost was $1500.00, the plaintiff would sell it to the
defendant for $500.00. Glaus, as m·anllg'er of the
r1Pfrndant, accepted it on this basis and the contract
-,nli' executed according-ly.
The thermotainer was delivered to the defendant some time in October of 1934, and invoiced to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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defendant under date of October 19.

(See Exhibit

A).

The defendant company kept and used the
'thermotainer in his place of business until April
or May, 1935, and no complaint of any kind was
ever made to the plaintiff company at Los Angeles
until after the thermotainer had been taken out of
use, at which time the defendant wrote to the Los
Angeles office as follows:
''I have had to take the thermotainer out
of service. It is not adaptable to my purpose. Advise me if there is- any disposition you can make of same." (Exhibit F).
The defendant had made some complaint during
March, 1935, to one Don Nelson, who was traveling
~alesman for the plaintiff company.
Long after the thermotainer was taken out of
service and wholly without any authority or direction from the plaintiff, the defendant expressed the
thermotainer back to the plaintiff at Los Angeles,
and some time thereafter requested the plaintiff
to credit it with $375.00. The plaintiff refused to
accept the return of the thermotainer and allow
defendant any credit therefor. By letter dated
January 9, 1936, the defendant mailed to plaintiff
a check for $152.44, stating in said letter:
'''We are enclosing• our- check for $152.44,
which is the amount our books show after
deducting $375.00, without interest credits
to your account. ''
Some time after the return of the thermotainer,
the defendant company claimed to have been
authorized to return the thermotainer for credit by
Don Nelson, the traveling salesman for plaintiff.
No direct authority from plaintiff was ever claimed, and no comn1nnication with plaintiff with reE:pect to the return of the thermotainer for credit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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or otherwise was had until after it had been expressed back to plaintiff at Los Angeles.
The plaintiff, upon receipt of the thermotainer,
notified the defendant that it would hold said thermotainer subject to defendant's order, and has
continued to hold the s.ame on defendant's account
and subject to defendant's order since it was returned. :rhe plaintiff refused to accept the check
of $152.44, and returned it to the defendant, wliereupon the defendant forwarded it to plaintiff's
attorne-y, and the same has been in the hands of
plaintiff's attorney until tendered in court at the
time of the trial herein, the plaintiff at all times
having refused to accept either the return of the
thermotainer or the tender of the $152.44.
No question has been raised with respect to
any part of the contract or any piece of equipment,
except this one item, which is known and designated as the thermotainer.

THE APPEAL PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION
1.

Whether or not there was any express warranty
made by plaintiff upon the sale of this piece of
equipment called the thermotainer.
~.

Whether there could be any warranty implied
in the sale of the thermotainer to defendant.

:t
·Whether or not there has been any breach of
warranty, either express or implied.
-t-.
Whether there wa.s any settlement agreement
with any authorized agent of the plaintiff company,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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acting within either the real or apparent scope of
the agency so as to make any such settlement binding upon the plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
DEFENSE OF WARRANTY ·
ExPREss ·wARRANTY

The evidence conclusively shows that there was
no express warranty made in connection with the
sale of the equipment involved herein. The evi~
dence relied on by the defendant, and the only evi~
dence produced in this connection was the testinwny of 1tfr. Glaus with respect to statements made
by the plaintiff's salesman at San Francisco, con(·erning which Mr. Glaus said:

"He showed me the equipment and he
says 'orie of the finest pieces of equipment
of all'." (Tr. 153).
Again"He says he guaranteed that piece of
equipment as one of the best of all." (Tr.
154).
This evidence is the only evidence anywhere in the
testimony with respect to any ·express warranty.
Merely that the salesman said he would guarantee
it as one of the finest pieces of equipment.
In the case of
Detroit V. S. Company v. ·Weiter L. Co.,
61 Utah 503,
th~ s Court had occasion to discuss language similar
to that claimed by defendant in this case in connection with a claimed warranty, and held that such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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statements did not constitute warranty .enforceable
either as a defense or as an independent cause of
action, but was merely dealers' talk.
See also the following cases:
Alexander v. Stone, 156 Pac. 998, (Cal.)
W. J. Bush & Co. v. Van Camp Sea Food
Co., 203 Pac. 1026, (Cal.)
Parker v. Hutchinson Motor Car Co., 274
Pac. 1115 ( Kan.)
In connection with this claim of express warranty, we would like to refer the Court to other
evidence. It is undisputed that Mr. Glaus, the president and manager of the defendant company, was
purchasing this equipment for the defendant company. He evidently knew something about res,taurant equipment) because he had been in that business for 25 to 30 years, and had gone to Los Angeles to buy miscellaneous equipment prior to his
opening of the Beau Brummel Cafe, and upon learning that the plaintiff company had this thermotainer at San Francisco, he made a special trip to
San Francisco to inspect it, and it was while there
that he claims these statements upon which he 'relies for an express warranty, were made.
Subsequent to his going to San Francisco to inspect this equipment, he went back to Los Angeles.
and it was on this return trip to Los AngJeles when
he signed with the plaintiff the conditional ~ales
contract, Exhibit A. There is no express warranty
contained in the contract, Exhibit A, and all-prior
negotiations are presumed to have been merged
in the written contract. Tha.t, in and of itself,
would defeat plaintiff's claim to an express warranty, and we think is such a well recognized rule
that it needs no citation of authority here. We
will, howPver, call the Court's attention to the
ease of
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Landes & Co. v. ],allows, reported in 81
Utah 432, at page 437; 19 Pac. (2d)
389.

IMPLIED WARRANTY
On page 15 of appellant's brief, there is
quoted the provisions of Sub-Section 1 of Section
15, Chapter 1 of rritle 81, Revised Statutes of Utah
1933, and, in reliance upon that authority, defendant ~.nd appellant claims that there should be a
-.varranty implied from the circumstances surrounding the sale of this thermotainer. In that
connection, however, we think it sigmificant to note
that the defendant has not pointed out in the brief
just where or in what part of the testimony it wa~
''expressly or by implication made known'' to the
seller the purpose for which the buyer wanted this
thermotainer. Nor is there anytthing either in tlw
evidence or in the argument of counsel for the defendant showing ''that the buyer relied on the
seller's skill or judgment.' :· ':rhe whole of the testimony of l\1r. Glaus and it is the only testimony
bearing upon the subject, because he is the one
who talked with plaintiff's representative in San
Francisco, was that plaintiff's salesman ''showed
me the equipment 'and he says one of the finest
pieces of equipment of all'." There is not one word
of evidence which shows or tends to show that Mr.
Glaus made any statement to the plaintiff company
or any of its agents as to the particular purpose for
.which he wanted this piece of equipment. Th~re
is not one word of testimony to indicate that Mr.
Glaus or anyone else connected with the defendant
company placed any reliance in the seller's statements or that he ~relied on the seller's skJil(l. or
judgment. On the contrary, Mr. Glaus made a
special trip from Los Angeles to San Francisco in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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order to personally inspect this item of equiprnent. The equipment was purchas.ed under a
specific name - a trade-name, and designated in
the contract to purchase as a thern1otainer. The
specific thermotainer that Mr. Glaus went to San
Francisco to inspect was sold to him and he bought
it after inspection. That specific thermotainer
was charged to hin1 pursuant to tlie contract, and
where such a specific article is purchased and de-·
livered after inspection by the proposed buyer,
there is no warranty implied as to the fitness for
any purpose, whether made known or not. To this
effect, see the case of
Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 19
Pac. ( 2'd) 389.
For all that appears from the evidence, the
defendant; and :Mr. Glaus as representing the defendant as a buyer of this equipment, relied on his
uwn judgment, based upon over 25 years' experience, rather than upon the judgment of the seller
and bought an article known by a specific name in
the trade, after he had made an inspection of the
same.
In the case of
Oil ·Well Supply Company v. Hopper, 282
Pac. 701,
.the defendant had bought from the plaintiff seamless pipe casing for an· oil well. The plaintiff
sued for a balance due, and the defendant counterclaimed for damages because of defect in the pipe.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the defendant's defense and counter-claim and directed
a verdict for the plaintiff upon the ground that
there was no implied warranty that the pipe was
J'it for thE' particular purpose for which it was
used. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in affirm-ing the trial court, quoted with approval from a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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United States Supreme Court case, and earlier
Kansas cas.es to the effect that
"a contract for the sale of a known, described and defined article manufactured
generally for the trade, in which no warranty is expressed, does not give rise to
an implied warranty of fitness. for the
purpose intended by the buyer, although
the seller knew the buyer was purchasing
it to accomplish that purpose."
J\1:ine Supply Company v. Columbia Mining Company, 86 Pac. 789 (Ore.) :
''Where one contracts or agrees to supply
an article to be applied or used for a particular purpose, and the buyer has no
opportunity of inspection, but relies upon
the judgment and skill of the seller, and
not his own, there is an implied warranty
that the article shall be reasonably fit and
suitable for the purpose intended . . .
but where, as in this case, a known and
described article is ordered, there is no
implied warranty of its fitness, if it is
actually furnished, although the seller
was advised that it was. intended for a
special purpose. If the purchaser gets, the
article he buys, and buys that which he
gets, he takes the risk of its suitableness
for the intended purpose, unless there is
an express warranty.''
In addition to the foregoing
following:

cas~es,

we cite the

Ehrsom v. Brown, 91 Bac. 179 (Kan.).
Young v. Plattner Implement Co., 91 P.ac.
1109 (Colo.).
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Peninsula Motor Co v. Daggett, 218 Pac.
253 (Wash.)
Illinois Zinc Co. v. Semple, 255 Pa.c. 78
(Kan.)
Stoehrer & P. Dodgem Corp. v. Greenburg,
146 N .E. 34 (:Mass.)
Peoria Grape Sugar Co. v. Turney, 51
N.E. 587 (Ill.)
Peoples Light Company v. Rathbun-Jones
Engineering Co., 218 Federal 167.
Flaherty v. Main ill otor Carriage Co., 104
Atl. 627 (Me.)
In this connection we also direct the Court's
attention to the case of
Baker v. Latses, 60 Utah 38; 206 Pac.
553,
wherein this Court held that upon t_he sale of
goods, where the goods were examined by the
buyer before buying, the rule of cave·at emptor
applies and no warranty is implied.
There is another very important reason why
there should not be any warranty implied with respect to the piece of equipment called the thermotainer involved in this action. This piece of equipment originally cost $1500.00, and the. plaintiff
company sold it to the defendant for $500.00 (Tr.
154). Mr. Glaus made a special trip to San Francisco to examine this thermotainer. That was his
only purpose in making the trip (Tr. 218). He
saw it at San Francisco and looked it over before
lw bought it, -was told at that time that it was
n secondhand piece of equipment, and bought it
as ·such, knowing that it was secondhand. (Tr.
231-:?32). Tt ·was of such a nature in its secondhand condition that while it originally sold for
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$1500.00, the plaintiff was selling it to the defendant for $500.00, one-third of the original cost.
It is a general rule, which prevails in most
jurisdictions that there is no implied warranty
as to the condition, adaptability, fitness, or suitability for the purpose for which made, or the quality of an article sold as and for a secondhand
article.
In the case of
Tibbetts & Pleasant Inc. v. Town of Fairfax, 292· Pac. 9 (Okla.),
the plaintiff brought suit for the purchase price
of certain machinery. The defendant claimed
damages for breach of implied warranty. The lower
court gave judgment for the plaintiff and on appeal
the defendant contended that
"since it was proved without dispute that
plaintiff was informed as to the purpose
for which the property was to he used by
the defendant, there was. an implied warranty of its fitness for such purpose, and
as the evidence showed that the machine
was worthless, the trial court erred in
rend '"'ring judgment in favor of the plaintiff; and in refusing to enter judgment in
favor of the defendant."
The machine was a secondhand machine. The de.fendant knew this and inspected the machine before purchasing it. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in affirming the trial court, held that
''the principal of an implied warranty, an
exception to the general rule of caveat
emptor, does not apply to the purchase of
8econdhand machinery.''
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ln a similar case
Lamb v. Otto, 197 Pac. 147,
from the State of California, involving the sale of
a secondhand automobile, the California appellate
court held that there was no implied warranty, and
that inasmuch as there was a written contract with
no ambiguity in it, the buyer could not give any
evidence of any claimed express warranties as to
the quality or character of the automobile, other
than as stated in the contract.
For similar holdings, see the following cases:
Colchord Machinery Company v. Loy Wilson Foundry & Machinery Co., 110
S. W. 630 (Mo.)
Old City Iron Works v. Belmont, 7 S. W.
(2d) 772, (Ark.)
Moore v. Switzer, 239 Pac. 87 4 (Colo.)
Hysko v. Morawski, 202 N. W. 923.
Perine Machinery Co., v. Buck, 156 Pac.
20 (Wash.)
McDonald v. Dorfman, 32 S. W. ( 2d) 443.
Jones v. Armstrong, 145 Pac. 949 (Mont.)
Johnson v. Carden, 65 So. 813 (Ala.)
Yellowjacket Mining Co. v. Tegarden, 149
S.W. 518 (Ark.)
J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Bailey,
11.5 S. W. 949 (Ark.)
Ramming v. Caldwell, 43 Ill. A~p. 175.
Norris v. Reinstedler, 90 Mo. App. 626.
Hanna Breckenridge Co. v. Holley Matthews Mfg. Co., 146 S. W. 923 (Mo.)
Joy v. National Exchange Bank, 74 S. ·W.
325 (Tex.)
Kernan v. Crook, 59 Atl. 753 (Md.)
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Am. Soda Fountain Co. v. Palace Drug
Store, 245 S.W. 1032 (Tex.)
In "onnection .with this question of implied
'warranty, we wish to refer to the cases cited by
appellant.
In the cas.e of Starr Piano Co. v. Martin, 7
Pac. (2d) 383) cited on page 15 of appellant's
:brief, there was a contract whieh, by its very terms,
:stated that the seller was selling to the buyer the
''following equipment designed for use in connection with Simplex Projecting Machines.'' By the
very terms of the contract, the seller contracted
that the machines were to be used and would work
with the Simplex Projecting machines. They failed to work with the projecting machines, and
clearly there was a breach of warranty.
In the case of Chicago Steel Foundry Company v. Crowell Company, 14 Pac. (2d) 1105, cited
on page 16 of appellant's brief, the evidence in the
case was not given in the opinion, but the syllabus,
written by the Court, informs us sufficiently to
distinguish that case from the case at bar, because
the Court therein states that
''where an article of personal property
is sold for a definite purpose made known
to· the seller and the seller represents
that the article will perform that particular purpose, there is a warranty of fitness . . . . "
There is no evidence in the case at bar that the
buyer even made known to the seller the particuJ,ar
purpose for which the thermotainer was being
bought. The defendant was buying a complete
set-up of restaurant equipment. There is no evidence that the seller in this case represented to
the buyer that the article would perform any parSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~.icular purpose.
i~ not in point.

The Chicago Steel Foundry case

In the case of \Villiams v. Lowenthal, 12 Pac.
(2d) 75, the buyer could neither read nor write,
and gave definite evidence that he relied upon the
representations n1ade by the seller as to what the
machine would do, and as to its condition. An exI:ress warranty was claimed in that case, as well
as an implied warranty and the Court found tha,t
.there was no express warranty, merely seller's
talk, but that there was an implied warranty because of the fact that the buyer knew nothing about
the machine, could not even read nor write, and
relied implicitly upon the seller's representations.
There is no evidence in the case at bar that can
make that case applicable here.
In the case of Sperry Flour Company v. De.l\tfoss, 18 Pac. (2d) 242, cited by appellant on page
17 of his. brief, the Appellate Court approved the
following instruction given by the lower court_:
'' . . . If you find . . . the defendant informed the plaintiff of the particular purpose for which the defendant required the
flour . . . and if the defendant. relied on
plaintiff's skill :or judgment, then I instruct. you there is an implied warranty.''
In the ease at bar, there was no evidence either
with regard to any particular purpose being made
known to the seller, nor with regard to any reliance by the buyer upon the plaintiff's skill or
jl1 dt:!nwnt, and there wasn't sufficient evidence to
allow the case to go to the jury upon any question
of implied warranty.
In connection with the quotation by appellant
on page 16 of its brief, from 55 Corpus Juris 757,
we sugge~t that the Court read the original text
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a little farther than counsel quoted it, because the
language given is qualified by a statement whicH
follows to the effect that it is necessary in such instance for the buyer to show reliance not upon the
trade mark, but upon the seller's skill and judg..
ment.
There isn't one scintilla of evidence in thio
case showing or tending to show that the defendant made known to the plaintiff any particular purpose for which it was buying this. equipment, nor
is there one scintilla of evidence to the effect that
the defendant relied upon the plaintiff's skilJ
and judgment rather than the skill and judgment which Mr. Glaus had obtained through
~5 years in the restaurant business.
l\f.r. Glaus,
on behalf of the defendant co1npany, went to San
Francisco to inspect this equipment for the very
r(~ason that he was not willing to rely upon representations or the skill and judginent of the plaintiff, and, having inspected the equipment and
knowing that it was secondhand, went back to Los
Angeles and signed a contract for the specific
item of equipment which he had inspected and
which was delivered to him. Clearly there can be
no implied warranty under such circumstances.

BREACII OF vVARRANTY
In spite of defendant's claims with respect to
warranties, either expressed or implied, the de.
fendant failed to introduce or even offer sufficient
evidence to go to the jury upon the question of
whether there had been any breach of warranty,
even were we to assume that a warranty had been
g1.ven. The burden of the whole of defendant's
testimony, both that offered by the officers of defendant and the cooks and other employee's was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

to the effect that this thermotainer ''dried out the
food.'' The testimony shows that this thermotainer
was so constructed that it had a dry heat com-partment, for the purpose of putting1 food in, similar to what we used to call warming ovens.. This
particular one had doors on it, both front and back
(Tr. 364), and the testimony which is undisputed
was to the effect that if these doors were kept
properly closed the food would not dry out. (Tr.
363-364). There was no evidence offered by the
defendant as to any length of time that food was
kept in this container, whether for minutes or for
a whole day. There was no evidence as to the
length of time it would take to dry the food out, and
+here was no evidence produced by the defendant
or any of its witnesses, or anyone else, to the effect
that in the operation of this :particular thermotainer, these doors were kept properly closed so
as to retain the original moisture in the food.
The defendant produced one expert w\itness,
an employee of the Utah Power & Light Company,
who had not only connected the equipment up
originally, but who had worked on the thermotainer
several times, and even with this witness, there was
not one statement that could inform us in any way
as to any defect in the machine itself. This expert
stated that "some of the units were out at different times'' (Tr. 203) and that he repaired those,
as well as some of the iead wires and coiUlections,
and that not at any· time when he checked the
equipmer:t did he find anything of a mechanical
nature wrong with this equipment, other than these
t:.nits burning out or something similar to that,
which he repaired or reconnected. ''No definite
trouble as to why it didn't work" that he could
put his finger on. (Tr. 203).
Mr. (J lan~ hin1self stated that he could not
tell how or in what manner it was defective. He
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did not know what the defect was, and the mechanio
didn't know what the defect was. (Tr. 228-231).
There was no one who testified in any manner as
to any actual defect in the machine itself. The
whole testimony was that the food dried out, and
the defendant did not even produce testimony to
show the length of time food was l.eft in the
machine or whether the doors were kept closed
\Properly, or whether the machine was operated as
it should have been; what temperatures were used
in connection with it, or any other reason from
which any court or jury could do anything except
speculate. Even Mr. Glaus, with the knov.rledge of
restaurant and cafeteria business, only made the
contplaint that it was not adaptable to his purposes,
and that it could no doubt be used to good advantage in school cafeterias or comn1ercial cafeterias.,
(See Exhibits F and G), and that "that is what it
was constructed for." (Tr. 2'30). There is no evidence that the plaintiff, or any of its agents, haa
rold Mr. Glaus that that was what it \vas constructed for. l-Ie knew something of the equipment himself, and, knowing what he did, he bought it, although he knew that it was primarily for cafeteria
purposes, and even when he determined it was not
adaptable for his purposes he still thought it could
be used advantageously for school or commercial
cafeterias. That "was what it was constructed
for." (Tr. 230).
Clearly, from such evidence, the Court would
not be warranted in letting the question of any
breach of a clain1ed warranty go to the jury for the
Jury to speculate on when the defendant itself not
only did not know, and could not tell, what the defect was or if there was any defect, but affirmatively testified that the equipment in its then condition
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could be used for cafeterias, and that was what it
was constructed for.
There are other requisites necessary to defendant's rase in which the record is wholly lacking.
Upon the question of any breach of warranty, the
defendant has the burden of proof, and when it is
seeking damages by way of n~c.ou~rzear, it has
the burden of showing either that the defective
merchandise is of no value whatsoever or else evidence must be adduced showing the actual value of
the merchandise, and then a claim asserted for thf'
difference between the actual value and the purchase price by way of recoupment. The def~ndant
did request the plaintiff to allow it a credit of
$375.00 some time after the return of the thermotainer. That would indicate that the defendant
considered there was some value in the equipment,
and yet there is no direct evidence that could g~ to
the jury from which a jury could determine the
actual amount of the damage suffered by appellant as a result of the claimed breach of warranty.
All that the jury could do in such a case would be
speculate. In the pleadings it was claimed by defendant in its defense of recoupment that it should
be allowed by way of recoupment, the whole of the
purchase price of $500.00, and yet there is not one
scintilla of evidence showing or tending to show
that the thermotainer was wholly valueless. On the
contrary, what evidence there if; would tend to show
that there was some value in the equipment, but
that it conld not he used hy the defendant company.
It was "not adaptable for its purpof;e." The deff'ndant failed to snstain its burden of proof upon
the question of breach of warranty.
The contract under whicf1 this merchandise waf:
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sold and delivered to defendant (Exhibit A) provides, paragraph 9 '' . . . buyer agrees that claim will be
made to the seller for all shortages, deficienci~s, and errors of every kind within
fifteen days from the date of scheduled
opening, or 15 days from the date of installation, whichever is later.''
The Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provide:
Section 81-3-9: " . . . But if, after the acceptance of the! goods, ~the buyer fails to ~ve
notice to the seller of the breach of any
promise or warranty within a reasonable
time after the buyer knows or ought to
know, of such breach, the seller shall not
he liable therefor.''
The thermota.iner was installed some time during the latter part of October, 1934. No notice
was given to the plaintiff company of any defect
~n its operation within fifteen days from the time
of the opening of the defendant cafe, or within
fifteen days from the installation as required by
the contract, and no notice of any kind was given
to the plaintiff company until late in .May, 193fi.
'I'he defendant does claim that it discussed the
thermotainer with the salesman Don Nelson, some
time around the middle of March, 19.35, and that it
notified him at that time that the thermotainer
was not working properly Thus, even giving the
defendant the benefit of this testimony, at least 41h
months elapsed from the time that the cafe opened
and from the time the thermotainer was put in use
before any complaint of any kind was f,riven, and a
period of 1% months in addition elapsed before
~omplaint was given direct to the plaintiff.
With respect to equipment used in a cafe business, where of necessitv
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tact and daily use of a machine, a period of 41f2
months is a much longer time than could or should
be considered as a reasonable time within which
.the buyer should give notice to the seller of any
claimed breach of warranty, pursuant to the provisions of the statute above quoted.

NO

V~.\LID

SETTLEJ\1ENT AGREEMENT

In addition to the claim of warranties and
breach thereof, the defendant relied to a great extent upon a claimed settlement supposed to have
been made "\\--ith plaintiff through one Don Nelson,
and relies entirely on what defendant claims as apparent authority in Don Nelson to make this settlement agreement. Defendant claims that the said
Don Nelson was an agent of the plaintiff, and states
that "the agency is admitted," and goes to some
extent in arguing on apparent authority and secret
limitations upon an agent's authority.
·
At the outset, we must remind couns.el for the
appellant that Don Nelson was not a general agent.
He was merely a traveling sales representative for
the plaintiff company, working out of the Portland
office, and his authority was limited to soliciting
orders for the company. Even the orders which he
solicited had to be submitted to and accepted by the
company before a binding contract was made. N eL
Ron had no connection whatsoever with the original
~ale of this merchandise, or with the sale of any bit
of the merchandise involved in the large contract
of goods bought by the defendant in October, 1934.
Nelson was the sales representative covering this
territory in 1935, and had been since 1929. The
authority to ~olicit orders for sales to be accepted
hy tlw plaintiff company at its home office did not
givP Nelson .-my general agency, and gave him no
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apparent authority to go beyond the usual things
done by a sales representative. Appellant, in its
brief, at page 7 states:
"He sold restaurant equipment; also collected money .and checks for plaintiff; also
reported on complaints of customers, had
attended to taking back merchandise in
dealings with customers and returned defective materials complained about . . . "
The appellant does not fairly state the record with
such a statement. Nelson did sell restaurant equipment. That was his duty with the company. He
had collected money on occasion, but there was only
one instance that the defendant, or any of its agents
knew about, where he had even done so much as colleded monev or checks. Mr. Glaus testified as to
~mne collections he thought Nelson bad made, but
.~tated that Mrs. Glaus kept the books and would
know more about that. Mrs. Glaus knew of only
one instance where Mr. Nelson had collected money
on any account, and in that instance Mrs. Glaus
called ~fr. Nelson and asked him to come and get a
payment, and she gave him a check payable to t~t
company. There is only this one occasion that Mrs.
Glaus could give any testimony on. (Tr, 280-281}.
Upon the cross- examination of Mr, Nelson,
counsel for the defendant asked him if he did not
attend to taking back merchandise and the return of
defective materials when customers complained
about therr1. The answer of ~ir. Nelson was emphatically in the negative. He had never adjusted any
accounts. He had listened to customers' complaints
and would send a report in to the home office
with respect to them, but stated emrphatically that
all adjustments had to be made with the home
office, and not with him; that he had not at any
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time taken back any defective merchandise and had
done nothing with resiJect to any complaints, or
the taking back of any claimed defective merchandise, except by specific instructions from the lwme
office to do so. No specific instance of any merchandise ever having been returned through the
mediation of :.Mr. Nelson was testified to, and he
never attended to taking back any merchandise or
equipment in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 374 to 376).
l~ven this testimony was admitted over the objection of the plaintiff. Even had Nelson made arrangements to take back merchandise on numerouR
occasions it would have availed the defendant nothing if the defendant had not known of Nelson's
prior dealings in that regard. There is not one
bit of testimony from the defendant compa.ny
or any of its officers or agents to the effect that
they kneu) of any course of prior dealtings wherein
the representative Nelson, or any other salesman,
or other agent of the plaintiff! company had made
arrangements for taking back anu materials claimed
to be defective. For this reason the defendant can
not claim any apparent authority or any reliance
upon apparent authority, because none had appeared to them from any dealings of plaintiff with
them prior to September, 1935, when the claimed
settlement agreement was supposed to have been
entered into.
Appellant specifically refers to the fact that
Nelson stated he would try to dispose of the thernwtainer for Glaus and "that he had no instructions from the company (plaintiff) at that time."
Nelson was doing that merely as a favor to .Glaus
and was not acting as agent for the' plaintiff comJ•an~' in doing so, nor did the defendant even attempt to ~how that the plaintiff ever had any knowL
edge of N eh;on 's stating to ~r r. Glaus that he would
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try and dispose of the thermotainer for Mr. Glaus in

his territory.
A very important item which successfully negatives any claim of the defendant to reliance upon
apparent authority in Mr. Nelson, is the evidence
which conclusively shows that Mr. Glaus, as president and manager of the defendant concern, knew
that the salesman, Nelson, did not have authority
to contract with defendant or to make arrangements with it for the return of this merchandise.
He not only did not rely upon any appearance of
authority, but he knew Nelson did not have the
authority. The testimony of Mr. Glaus with respect to it is -

''I told him something had to be done
abo·ut the thermotainer, and he s.aid he
would write his house to find out what
thev could do. In about a day or two
be~ told me he had had an answer . . . "
(Tr. 163 and 189).
Again,
''and I told him something had to be done
about the thermotainer, because we had it
in the warehouse. We couldn't use it, and
he said he would write his house to find
out, and about two days later . . . he said
he had an answer. (Tr. 165).
"What did Mr. Nelson say as to what he
received?

"He said he had a telegram."

(Tr. 167).

;Mr. Nelson did write the plaintiff with respect to
the complaints made by defendant concerning the
thermotainer, but even this writing was done at the
request of Mr. Glaus, because Glaus knew that Nelson did not have authority in himself to settle the
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matter. Upon cross-examination, in response to
the question ''and you asked him to write his
house1'' Mr. Glaus answered "yes." (Tr. 225).
This is confirmed by the letter (Exhibit F)
written by ~Ir. Glaus to the plaintiff at Los Angeles,
wherein Mr. Glaus states:
":Jir. Don \Y. Nelson, of the Portland office, is here today and I have asked him
to write you direct and which he is doing.':·
Mr. Glaus, the president and manager of the
defendant company, knew that Nelson was merely
a traveling sales representative. He knew that he
did not have the authority to enter into any binding contract for the return of any merchandise, or
the adjustment of any account, and he specifically
requested Nelson to take the matter up with the
home office to see what could be done·. Glaus had
notice of the limitations on the authority possessed
by Nelson, and he admitted that Nelson told him
that he had received a wire in response to the letter
which he had written the Los Angeles office at the
request of Glaus. This letter was specific authorIty to Nelson in excess of what he had as mere
sales representative, and was not merely secret
limitations on a general authority. It was a specific authority given in excess of authority known
by Glaus to be repDsed in Nelson and Mr. Glaus, as
agent of the defendant and, the defendant corporation ih~elf was bound by the limitations of that
authorit:v as conferred in the telegram .
.Another phase of this question arises. from the
fact that there was no holding out of J\1r. Nelson as
having authority to do any particular act in question here, hy the plaintiff company. There never
was any act of the plaintiff company, upon which
the defcndm1t did or could have relied, by which
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the plaintiff company held the agent Nelson out as
possessing any authority whatsoever. Even the
authority of Nelson as a sales agent was not men"
tioned or commented on between the plaintiff and
defendant until after the return of the thermotainer. As far as the plaintiff might have been
concerned, the salesman Nelson might never have
written to the home office, but might merely have
stated to Glaus that he would write to get authority
and then a day or two later might have told Glaus
that he did have authority. Mr. Glaus claims that
he did not see the telegram. He relied on Nelson
even for information to the effect that the plaintiff company had communicated with Nelson. A
total stranger might have gone to Glaus and stated
to him ''I will write to the Dohrman Company of
Los Angeles, and see if they will take the thermotainer hack.'' Then that s.tranger may have gone
to Glaus in a day or two and stated "I have a telegram,'' and then recited to Glaus the terms upon
\Tth: e1t he could return the thermotainer.
Would
the defendant contend that the plaintiff company
would have held that stranger out as its agent whNl
all the defendant had was the statements of
this stranger to rely on. That i:.; exactly the situa-·
tion in the case at bar.
The claimed contracting for the return of this-.
thermotainer was not within the implied powers or
scope of the agency of Nelson, as a salesman. There
was no holding out whatsoever by the company
from which the defendant could assume any authorHy in excess of that granted to a sales.man. There
was no course of prior dealings, either with the
salesman Nelson or any other agent of tlle plaintiff company that would warrant the defendant in
believing that the plaintiff cmnpany would recognize the acts of such an agent. In fact, all there
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

was that was known 'to the defendant ;eompany
was the fact that Nelson had at one time, on one
occasion accepted one check payable to the plaintiff company upon an order of goods that he had
actually sold to the defendant or to one or the
other of the companies operated by Mr. and Mrs.
Glaus.
The authorities are uniform and without exception that under such circumstances a traveling
salesman does not have any implied and there is
no apparent authority upon which any third person can rely and attempt to bind the supposed
principal.
A case directly in point upon this phase of,
the subject is the case of
Chamberlain v. Amalgamated Sugar Company, 247 Pac. 12 (Ida.)
'fhe plaintiff Chamberlain claimed that the foreman of the defendant sugar company had entered
into a contract on behalf of the defendant, authorizing the plaintiff to haul lime rock, with the provision in the contract that there would be a minimum tonnage required, and that the plaintiff would
be allowed to haul that minimum tonnage and be
paid therefor. The defendant company did pay
for rock actually hauled, but denied any obligation
to pay for any minimum tonnage. The plaintiff
sued for damages for breach of this contract, and
the trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff on
the basis of apparent or ostensible authority. In
:reversing the judgment of the trial court the Idaho
Supreme Court stated:
1

''There i~ no evidence that theretofore contracts of a like kind had been entered into
by appellant's foren1an on its behalf, no
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contract being entered into for any spe-·
cified amount of rock or covering· a specified period of time, and there is no evi-dence in the record that would justify the
conclusion that contracts made by appellant's foreman with third parties were upon any other basis than from day to day.
It 'is apparent from the record that there
was no conduct on the part of appellant
from previous courses of dealing with respondent or third parties that could be such
that implied authority would flow to its
foreman to enter into the contract in question. It is the conduct of the pri.ncipal,
and not the agent, that binds the principal.
Madill v. Spokane Cattle Loan Co., 39 Idaho 754; 230 P. 45; 2 C. J., Sec. 214, p. 574;
Anderson v .. Patten,· 157 Iowa 23; 137 N. W.
1050.
''Even conceding the agreement between the
respondent and appellant's foreman to be as
stated in respondent's testimony, the question arises whether or not there is sufficient
competent proof to bind the appellant. The
only evidence upon this point consisted of
statements and declarations of appell,ant's
foreman, and it is a well-known rule that
the declarations of the agent, standing
alone, are insufficient to prove the grant
of power exercised by him and to bind his
principal to third parties. . . . '' (Italics
ours).
In that case, the plaintiff had requested the
foreman to give him a contract in writing. Even
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tlmt '.Ya.s not necessarily a showing that the plaintiff had doubts as to the foren1an's authority.
In the case at bar Glaus requested Nelson to
write the Los Angeles office, thereby showing that
he knew Kelson did not have the authority in the
first place. Nelson told him he received some answer, and Glaus, according to his own testimony,
did not even request to see the instructions and
authority g'iven :to Nelson ·in \the teleg1ram. Hj8
was content to accept the declarations of Nelson
without inquiring directly of the plaintiff company or without even asking to see the telegram.
In the Idaho Sugar case, with respect to the
lack of the written contract, the Court stated, (p.

14):
''Respondent was content to accept the
declarations of the foreman after having
requested a contract in writing in order to
bind the company, . . , The rule would
seem to be that a person dealing with am
agent should ascertain the extent of his
authority from the principal . . . If such
person makes no inquiry: but chooses tc
rely upon the aqent's statement. he is
chargBable with knowledge of the agent's
author,ity, and his ignorance of its extent
will be no excuse to him, and the .fault
cannot be thrown upon the principal who
never authorized the act or contract.
''
(Italics ours).
Another Idaho case is the case of
Tweedie Footwear Corporation v. RobertsSchofield Company, 285 Pac. 476.
In that ca~~(' a salesman of the Tweedie Footwear
Company secured two orders for shoes which were
~igned hy the d0fendant company; the orders were
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iorwarded by the salesman to the home office. The
shoes were manufactured and delivered to the defendant. It was contended by the de-fendant that
the orders were given to the salesman with thet
understanding that if any of the shoes could not
be used, they might be returned. The defendant
company attempted to take advantage of the agree_
ment, purportedly made by the salesman and returned some of the shoes. The shoe company sued
for the balance of the purchase price. The trial
court gave judgment for the plaintiff for only part
of' the full purchase price and on appeal the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial
court with directions to enter judgment for the
full amount. The Supreme Court held that a traveling salesman for a manufacturer was held, as a
1natter of law, to be without implied authority to
give a purchaser an option of returning part of the
merchandise after delivery, that the authority of
th0 traveling salesman extended merely to the
goliciting and transmitting of orders, and went no
further.
In the case of
Burroughs Adding Machine Company v.
Harris 7 279 Pac. 216 (Cal.),
a sales agent, after selling an adding machine, wa~
told by the buyer that the machine was unsatisfactory, whereupon the salesman said ''send it
back and I will cancel the contract." The California Court of Appeals held tbere was no authority to return the machine.
A rather early case on the subject is the case
of
Brigham v. Hibbard, 43 Pac. 383 (Ore.)
One Wetmore was agent for the plaintiff in soliciting an order for the salE' of goods to the defendant.
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~he g~oods were shipped, and on receipt hy the deiendant) it was claimed that they were not as rep'resented. The defendant notified the salesman,
"\Y etmore, and claimed that the salesman agreed
with the defendant for the defendant to retain
possession of the goods, and that he Wetmore,
would take them and sell them on plaintiff's
account. The trial court refused to admit evidence
of this purported agTeement betwe.en the defendant
and the agent Wetmore. On appeal, the rejection
of this evidence was assigned as error, and in
affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court of
Oregon stated, (p. 383) :

''The assignment or error is not well
taken, because it does not appear that
Wetmore had authority to cancel the contract between plaintiff and defendant, or
substitute a new one, or to bind the plain-tiff by any agreement in reference to the
future disposition of the goods. He was
traveling agent and solicitor of orders for
his principal, but such authority did not
give him power to rescind or change the
contract after the receipt of. the goods by
defendant. . . . it was not within the scope
of Wetmore's agency to make a new contract for the plaintiff in reference to such
goods. Finding no error in the record, the
judgment of the court below' must he
affirmed.''
l\f r. Glaus knew Nelson did not have the
authority he now claims to have relied on, as is
shown by the fact that he requested Nelson to write
for authority. A third party who knows or is
advised that the agent does not have the power
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which the agent purports to exercise, cannot rely
upon any apparent authority.
In the case of
American National Bank v. Bartlett, 40
Federal (2d) 21 (Okla.),
a purported agent had told the bank cashier that
,he (the agent) "would have to take it up with Mr.
Mayer," his principal. The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge McDermott, held that this was sufficient to give the
bank information that the agent did not have the
authority they claimed to rely on, and that under
such eircumst.ances, the bank was not juRtified in
claiming reliance on any apparent authority.
The particular authority which Nelson had in
this instance was specific authority granted him
by the telegram (Exhibit 1), and was not merely a
secret limitation upon any general authority which
he had. It was a specific written authority g1ranted
to him for a specific purpose. The general rule
in this connection is stated in
2 Corpus Juris Secundun1, Sec. 92h, page
1191:
''·Where the authority under which an
agent assumes to act in a particular case
originates in a written instrument which
sets forth its nature and extent, and the
person dealing with him knows or is
deemed by the law to know of the existence of such instrument, the latter is affected
with knowledge of the contents of the in-:strument and is visited with all the consequences of knowledge or notice of the
scope of authority . . . ''
''Furthermore, regardless of any question
of legal requirement, where the power is
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in fact created by a writing, and the third
person is chargeable with notice of that
fact he is under the duty of discovering
the extent and limits of the agent's author~
ity and will be regarded as being aware of
them; . . . "
It will be instructive here to note the basis of
the doctrine of apparent or ostensible authority.
2 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 96c, page
1211.

''The doctrine of apparent authority rests
upon principles of estoppel, or in the nature
of an estoppel, forbidding one to deny to
the prejudice of those~ he has misled. the
consequences of an appearance of power
which he produced.''
''
Ultimately it is but another application of the fundamental maxim that any
loss from misconduct of a third person
should fall on that one of two innocehf persons dealing through him who, by his confidence, has made the loss possible.''
See also
2 American Juris prudence, Section 104,
page 88.
In connection with ostensible or apparent
authority, we must keep in mind that there are
certain fundamental requirements" elements that
must be present to raise an apparent or ostensible
authority. There must either be a course of dealing on behalf of theS41pposed agent for some tin1e
prior to the time in question that has been known
io and relied on by the third party claiming the
apparent agency, and that has been approved or
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acquiesced in by the principal, or there must he
direct action or representations made by the principal to the third party in such a way that the
principal himself is the one who has actually created the appearance of authority.
See
2 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 96d (3),
page 1213.
2 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 96e, page
1214.
'' \Vhen an apparent authority is claimed
to arise from representations or conduct,
the acts and statements of the principal
must be looked to for the requisite foundation and not those of the ag:ent; the
former alone can give rise to authority of
this character; the latter are never in
themselves sufficient for that purpose.

,,

'' . . . and no mere combination of circumstances which may, without the principal's
participation, mislead third persons, however reasonably, into a false inference of
authority affords a sufficient predicate
for apparent authority.''
''"Where the principal's first knowledge
that the agent is assuming to exercise
powers of such character .as those underlying the third person's claim comes to
h'im, and his first acquiescence occurs.
subsequent to the transaction with the
agent whereon such person relies., jt is incapable of supplying a basis for apparent
authority, which can only be found in eonduct by the principal preceding the dealSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing and available at that time to induce
reliance. ' '
2 American Juris prudence, Sec. 103, p. 85.
" . . . :l\Ioreover, the apparent authority
for which the principal may be liable must
be traceable to him, and cannot be es.tablished solely by the acts and conduct of
the agent; the principal is only liable for
that appearance of authority caused by
himself. . . . "
See also
2 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 100, page
,~

81.

2 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 130, page
105.
In connection with the above authorities, we
cite to the Court, the following case·s, in addition
to those hereinbefore given.
Graef v. Bowles, 248 Pac. 1090 (Ore.)
Gates v. Flanagin, 31 S. W. (2d) 945
(Ark.)
Bagot v. Intermountain l\1illing Company,
196 Pac. 824 (Ore.)
Post v. City and County Bank, 183 Bac.
802 (Ore.)
Pac. States Corp. v. Gill, 206 Pac .. 489
(Cal.)
Jones v. l\farshall-Wellls Co., 208 Pac. 768.
Commerce Furniture & U. Co. v. ·White
Sewing Machine Co., 222 Pac. 516
(Okla.)
1IcMurray v. Pac. Heady Cut Home, 295
Pac. 542 (Cal.)
The appellant in its brief, contends that the
telegram contained secret instructions which should
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not be chargeable to the defendant. In this connection we would only refer counsel to the general
rule as. stated in
2 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 105, p. 89,
where we read :
'' . . . Special or secret instructions or
limitations upon the authority of an agent.
whose powers would otherwise be coextensive with the business intrusted to
him must be communicated to the party
with whom he deals, or the principal will
be bound to the same extent as though they
were not given . . . '' (Italics ours).
Counsel quotes on page 10 of appellant's brief
from 2 Corpus Juris, Sec. 731, page 9~60. Couns.el
left out a part of the quotation which we s:upply
here:
''
. . But whether or not there is any
evidence tending to prove the existence of
an agency is for the court to determine,
and if there is none, or if it is so slight
that a finding thereon of the existence of
the agency would not be sustained, the
question should be disposed of by the court
alone, and should not be submitted to the
jury; nor should the question be submitted
to them where the facts relating· to the
existence of the agency are undisputed
and are such that only one reasonable
conclusion can be drawn therefrom . . . "
Also, counsel quotes from page 962, Section
733, but we add the following which counsel negler.ted
to add, after the portion quoted in counsel's brief:
" . . . But whether there is any competent evidence to establish the extent of
the authority js a question of law for the
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court, and it has been held that such question should be disposed of by the court
alone and should not be submitted to the
jury where there is no competent evidence,
or where it is clear and undisputed, or
n1anitc~tly insufficient to prove the authority, or where the facts relating to the
authority are undisputed and are such that
reasonable minds could draw only one conclusion therefrom; . . . "
In the case at bar there was absolutely no
evidence of any holding out by the principal in
this case. There was no prior course of dealing
known to or relied upon by the defendant. There
was no actual authority in the agent, Nelson, with
merely secret limitations on it, but there was actual
written authority more extensive than the limited
authority already known to the defendant company.
The witness. Nelson was a sales agent, and no more.
There was no other authority conferred orally or
otherwise, and none can be implied from the agent,
Nelson's acts, nor the circumstances surrounding
them, without connecting them up with thP principal.
On page 11 of appellant's brief, it is stated
that "there is no dispute that Nelson was plaintiff's agent, and was authorized to contract for
the return of the thermotainer.'' To the contrary,
there is a dispute as to this authority. Nelson was
merdy a ~alesman. Such a contract was not a part
of, nor could it be implied from his general sales
agencv. The onlv authoritv that Nelson would
kwf· to enter int~ such a co~tract was by specific
written in~trnction contained in the telegram, and
of thi~ defendant had sufficient notice. It was a case
of ~'pecifie authority upon a specific thing, wholly
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man's Nelson's authority, and there was no act
'
' principal upon whl.ch
. the dewhatsoever
of the
fendant did or could have relied in claiming1 to deal
with Nelson. In such a case a third party deals
with such an agent at his peril.

SUMMARY

1.
The evidence conclusively shows in this case
that there were no express warranties; that the
statements claimed to have been made to defendant were mere dealer's talk and were prior to and
merged in the written contract, Exhibit A, in which
no express warranty is contained.

2.
No warranty can be implied in the sale of

thi~

t h ermotainer,

(a) Because. there is not one bit of evidence showing that defendant informed
the plaintiff of the purpose for which the
thennotainer was \vanted.
(b) There is not one scintilla of evidence
of any reHa;nce by the :buyer npo11 the
<seller's skilJ and judgment.. On the contrary the defendant relied upon the knowledge and skill of its president and manager, Mr. Glaus, gained through over 25
years of experience.
(c) The thermotainer was bought after
the defendant had made a speeial trip
from Los Angeles, to San Francisco for the
purpose of and after a full examination
and inspectioln of the thermotainer, and
the particular thermotainer inspected was
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bought by the defendant and delivered by
the plaintiff.
(d) The thermotainer, known by defendant to be a piece of secondhand equipment,
was bought by defendant as such, after such
knowledge and after complete inspection,
and no warranties are implied in the sale
of secondhand equipment.

3.
There is no evidence whatsoever - it is not
a question of , sutfficient eviden~, but a lack of
evidence altogether, "ith respect to what, if any,
defect there was in this machine, or whether there
was any breach of w'arranty. The testimony clearly showed that Mr. Glaus, the manager of the defendant company, while claiming the equipment to
be defective, merely because it dried out the foods,
still said that it would work all right in cafeteriaR,
for which it was originally made.
Clearly there is no sufficient evidence to allow
a jury to do anything but speculate, as far as the
record shows in this case.

4.
No settlement agreement binding upon the
plaintiff was entered into, because, taking the evidence most favorable to the defendant and disregarding the denials made by the witness Nelson,
with respect to the purported agreement, there was
no apparent authority upon which the defendant
did or could have relied in s.eeking to hold the
plaintiff company for a contract purportedly made
by N eIson in violation of specific written instructions. There was no previous course of dealin~
lwtween t1H• witness Nelson, and the defendant that
l1ad been acquiesced in by the plaintiff. There wa~
not one :-:eintilla of evidence of the defendant's having known of any prior occasion when Nelson, or
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v.ny other similar salesm:n, arranged to take back
merchandise. There was no act of the plaintiff, as
principal, acquiescing in any representation or
statement 1nade by Nelson. 'fhere was no action
of or representation made by the plaintiff direct
to the defendant with reference to Nelson. In fact,
on the contrary, there was specific knowledge on
the part of Glaus, as president and manager of the
defendant company, to the effect that Nelson did
not have the authority to contract to take the thermotainer hack, and at Glaus' request Nelson wrote to
get the attitude of the plaintiff company with re..
gard to the thermotainer. The defendant knew
that whatever authority was given came by way of
telegram, and would of necessity have to be in excess of the powers held by Nelson as a salesman.
'fhe defendant was bound by the limitations contained in that telegram, Exhibit 1, and there was no
authority in the salesman Nelson to make any contract whatsoever upon the basis of any apparent or
ostensible authority other than merely the soliciting of orders for the sale of merchandise, and the
sending in of those orders for acceptance and approval of the home office.
With respect to the items of costs, we would
like to direct counsel's attention to Section
104-44-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, with respect to the premium on the cost bond and remind
·counsel of the fact that the court reduced his. item·
from $30.00 to $9.00.

The court did not err in directing a verdict
for the plaintiff, and the judgment should be
affirmed.
Re·spectfully submitted,
IRVINE, SKEEN, THURMAN & MINER,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Re.,
~---~·
IJ\J ....
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